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Establishing the security of continuous-variable quantum key distribution against general attacks
in a realistic finite-size regime is an outstanding open problem in the field of theoretical quantum
cryptography if we restrict our attention to protocols that rely on the exchange of coherent states.
Indeed, techniques based on the uncertainty principle are not known to work for such protocols,
and the usual tools based on de Finetti reductions only provide security for unrealistically large
block lengths. We address this problem here by considering a new type of Gaussian de Finetti
reduction, that exploits the invariance of some continuous-variable protocols under the action of
the unitary group U(n) (instead of the symmetric group Sn as in usual de Finetti theorems), and
by introducing generalized SU(2, 2) coherent states. Crucially, combined with an energy test, this
allows us to truncate the Hilbert space globally instead as at the single-mode level as in previous
approaches that failed to provide security in realistic conditions. Our reduction shows that it is
sufficient to prove the security of these protocols against Gaussian collective attacks in order to
obtain security against general attacks, thereby confirming rigorously the widely held belief that
Gaussian attacks are indeed optimal against such protocols.
Quantum key distribution (QKD) is a cryptographic
primitive aiming at distributing large secret keys to two
distant parties, Alice and Bob, who have access to an
authenticated classical channel. Mathematically, a QKD
protocol E is described by a quantum channel, that is a
completely positive trace-preserving (CPTP) map trans-
forming an input state, typically a large bipartite en-
tangled state shared by Alice and Bob, into two keys,
ideally two identical bit strings unknown to any third
party. Establishing the security of the protocol against
arbitrary attacks means proving that the map E is ap-
proximately equal to an ideal protocol F . An opera-
tional way of quantifying the security is by bounding the
completely positive trace distance, or diamond distance
between the two maps [1]: the protocol is said to be ε-
secure if ‖E − F‖⋄ ≤ ε. If E and F act on some Hilbert
space H and ∆ = E − F , then the diamond norm is
defined as
‖∆‖⋄ = sup
ρ∈S(H⊗H′)
‖(∆⊗ 1H′)(ρ)‖1 (1)
where ‖ ·‖1 is the trace norm and S(H⊗H′) is the set of
normalized density matrices (positive operators of trace
1) on H ⊗ H′ with H′ ∼= H (see e.g. [2]). Computing
an upper bound of Eq. (1) is very challenging in general
because the Hilbert space H = H⊗n1 has a dimension
scaling exponentially with the number n of quantum sys-
tems shared by Alice and Bob. Typical values of n range
in the millions or billions.
In order to estimate the diamond norm, it is natural to
exploit all the symmetries displayed by ∆. For instance,
if E is a QKD protocol involving many 2-qubit pairs, such
as BB84 for instance [3], then ∆ might be covariant under
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any permutation of these pairs. For such maps, Chris-
tandl, Ko¨nig and Renner [4] showed that the optimiza-
tion of Eq. (1) can be dramatically simplified provided
that one is only interested in a polynomial approxima-
tion of ‖∆‖⋄: indeed, it is then sufficient to consider a
single state, called a “de Finetti state”, instead of opti-
mizing over H⊗H′ ∼= (C4)n⊗(C4)n. More precisely, this
de Finetti state is a purification of τH =
∫
σ⊗nH1 µ(σH1),
where H1 ∼= C4 is the single-system Hilbert space and
µ(·) is the measure on the space of density operators on
a single system induced by the Hilbert-Schmidt metric.
This approach, called a de Finetti reduction, has been
applied successfully to analyze the security of QKD pro-
tocol such as BB84 [5] or qudit protocols [6]. Indeed,
computing the value of ‖(∆ ⊗ 1H′)τHH′‖1 for some pu-
rification τHH′ of τH is usually tractable and is closely re-
lated to the task of establishing the security of the QKD
protocol against collective attacks, corresponding to re-
stricting the inputs of E to i.i.d. states of the form σ⊗nH1 .
A full security proof then consists of two steps: proving
the security against these restricted collective attacks,
and applying the de Finetti reduction to obtain security
(with a polynomially larger security parameter) against
general attacks.
An outstanding problem in the theory of QKD is to ad-
dress the security of protocols with continuous variables,
that is protocols encoding the information in the continu-
ous degrees of freedom of the quantified electro-magnetic
field [7, 8]. From a practical point of view, the essential
difference between continuous-variable (CV) protocols
and discrete-variables ones lies in the detection method:
CV protocols rely on coherent detection, either homo-
dyne or heterodyne depending on whether one or two
quadratures are measured for each mode, while discrete-
variable protocols use photon counting. The main theo-
retical difference is the Hilbert space H, which is infinite-
dimensional for CV QKD, corresponding to a 2n-mode
2Fock space: H = F (Cn ⊗ Cn) =⊕∞k=0 Symk(Cn ⊗ Cn),
where Symk(H) stands for the symmetric part of H⊗k.
Note that the definition of Eq. (1) is formally restricted
to finite-dimensional spaces, but we will ignore this is-
sue here because one can always truncate H to make its
dimension finite (arbitrary large) and will therefore as-
sume that the supremum can still be taken on H⊗H′ for
H′ ∼= H. For later convenience, let us denote H by F1,1,n
and H⊗H′ by F2,2,n := F (C2n ⊗C2n) ∼= F1,1,n ⊗ F1,1,n.
A possible strategy to prove the security of such CV
protocols is to follow the same steps as for BB84: first es-
tablish the security against collective attacks, then prove
that this implies security against general attacks (with
a reasonable loss). For protocols involving a Gaussian
modulation of coherent states and heterodyne detection
[9], composable security against collective attacks was re-
cently demonstrated in [10]. The second step is to apply
the de Finetti reduction outlined above. The difficulty
here comes from the infinite dimensionality of the Fock
spaceH. In order to apply the technique of [4], it is there-
fore needed to truncate the Fock space in a suitable man-
ner. This can be achieved with the help of an energy test,
but unfortunately, the local dimension of H1, the trun-
cated single-mode space, needs to grow like the logarithm
of n, for the technique to apply [11]. Indeed, the tech-
nique of [4] was developed for finite-dimensional systems,
and the energy test needs to enforce that with high prob-
ability, each the unmeasured modes contains a number of
photons below some given threshold. Such a guarantee
can only be obtained for a threshold increasing logarith-
mically with n. The dimension of the total truncated
Hilbert space is then super-exponential in n, on the or-
der of (logn)Cn, for some constant C > 1. Since the loss
in the security parameter obtained with [4] is superpoly-
nomial in the dimension of the total Hilbert space, this
means that if the protocol is ε-secure against collective
attacks, this approach only shows that the protocol is also
ε′-secure against general attacks with ε′ = ε× 2polylog(n).
While this gives a proof that the protocol is asymptoti-
cally secure in the limit of infinitely large block lengths,
it fails to provide any useful bound in practical regimes
where n ∼ 106− 109. We note that a related strategy re-
lies on the exponential de Finetti theorem but fails simi-
larly to provide practical security bounds in the finite-size
regime [12, 13].
Let us also mention that there exists a CV QKD pro-
tocol with proven security where Alice sends squeezed
states to Bob instead of coherent states [14]. This pro-
tocol can be analyzed thanks to an entropic uncertainty
relation [15], but this technique requires the exchange
of squeezed states, which makes the protocol much less
practical. Moreover, this approach does not recover the
secret key rate corresponding to Gaussian attacks in the
asymptotic limit of large n, even though these attacks
are expected to be optimal. Here, in contrast, we are
interested in the security of CV protocols based on the
exchange of coherent states.
The idea that we exploit in this paper is that CV QKD
protocols not only display the permutation invariance
common to most QKD protocols, but also a specific sym-
metry with a continuous-variable flavor [16]. This new
symmetry is linked to the unitary group U(n) instead of
the symmetric group Sn. More precisely, the protocols
are covariant if Alice and Bob process their n respective
modes with linear-optical networks acting like the uni-
tary u ∈ U(n) on Alice’s annihilation operators and its
complex conjugate u on Bob’s annihilation operators.
Our main technical result is an upper bound on ‖∆‖⋄
for maps ∆ covariant under a specific representation of
the unitary group. For such maps, we show that is it suf-
ficient to consider again a single state, which is the purifi-
cation of a specific mixture of Gaussian i.i.d. states. This
in turn will imply that it is sufficient to establish the secu-
rity of the protocol against Gaussian collective attacks in
order to prove the security of the protocol against general
attacks. An important technicality is that we still need to
truncate the total Hilbert space to replace it by a finite-
dimensional one. Crucially, this truncation can now be
done globally and not for single-mode Fock spaces as in
[11] and this is this very point that makes our approach
so effective. Indeed, in our security proof, we argue that
it is sufficient to consider states that are invariant under
the action of U(n) and such states live in a very small
subspace of the ambient Fock space. More precisely, the
dimension of the restriction of this subspace to states
containing K photons grows polynomially in K, instead
of exponentially in the case of the total Fock space. This
phenomenon is reminiscent of the fact that the dimen-
sion of the symmetric subspace of (C⊗d)⊗n only grows
polynomially in n if the local dimension d is constant.
The consequence is that the security loss due to the
reduction from general to collective attacks will not scale
like 2polylog(n)) anymore, but rather like O(n4), which be-
havesmuch more nicely for typical values of n, and yields
the first practical security proof of a CV QKD protocol
with coherent states against general attacks. Indeed, our
security reduction performs even better than the origi-
nal de Finetti reduction developed for BB84, where the
security loss scales like O(n15) [4].
Ideally, truncating the Fock space could be done by
projecting the quantum state given as an input to ∆
onto a finite dimensional subspace with say, less than
K photons (where the value of K scales linearly with the
total number of modes). Of course, such a projection
P is unrealistic, and one will instead apply an energy
test T that passes if the energy measured on a small
number k ≪ n of modes is below some threshold and will
abort the protocol otherwise. Such an idea was already
considered in previous works dealing with the security
of CV QKD [11, 13, 17]. An application of the triangle
inequality (see Lemma 18 in the appendix) yields:
‖∆ ◦ T ‖⋄ ≤ ‖∆ ◦ P‖⋄ + 2‖(1− P) ◦ T ‖⋄. (2)
In other words, it is sufficient for our purposes to show
the security of the protocol restricted to input states sub-
ject to a maximum photon number constraint, provided
3that we can bound the value of ‖(1 − P) ◦ T ‖⋄, which
corresponds to the probability that the energy test passes
but that the number of photons in the remaining modes
is large.
Analysis of the energy test.—We show that ‖(1−
P) ◦ T ‖⋄ is indeed small for a maximal number of pho-
tons K scaling linearly with n (see Appendix G). The
energy test T (k, dA, dB) depends on 3 parameters: the
number k of additional modes that will be measured
for the test and maximum allowed average energies dA
and dB for Alice and Bob’s modes. The input of the
state is a 2(n + k)-mode state. Alice and Bob should
symmetrize this state by processing them with random
conjugate linear-optical networks and measure the last
k modes with heterodyne detection, corresponding to a
projection of standard (Glauber) coherent states. If the
average energy per mode is below dA for Alice and dB for
Bob, the test passes and Alice and Bob apply the proto-
col E0 to their remaining modes. Otherwise the protocol
simply aborts. These thresholds dA, dB should be chosen
large enough to ensure that the energy test passes with
large probability. Note that the symmetrization of the
state can be done on the classical data for the protocols
of Refs [9, 18] since these protocols require both parties to
measure all the modes with heterodyne detection, which
itself commutes with the action of the linear-optical net-
works. For this, Alice and Bob need to multiply their
measurement results (gathered as vectors for R2n) by an
identical random orthogonal matrix. There is also hope
that this symmetrization can be further simplified, but
we do not address this issue here.
An upper bound on ‖∆ ◦ P‖⋄ via de Finetti
reduction.— This requires two main ingredients: first,
a proof that any mixed state on F1,1,n that is invariant
under the action of the unitary group admits a purifica-
tion in the symmetric subspace F
U(n)
2,2,n , and second, that
Gaussian states resolve the identity on the symmetric
subspace. The symmetric subspace F
U(n)
2,2,n was introduced
and studied in Ref. [19] and is defined as follows:
F
U(n)
2,2,n = {|ψ〉 ∈ F2,2,n : Wu|ψ〉 = |ψ〉, ∀u ∈ U(n)} ,
where u 7→ Wu is a representation of the unitary group
U(n) on the Fock space F2,2,n corresponding to map-
ping the 4n annihilation operators ~a = (a1, . . . , an),~b =
(b1, . . . , bn),~a
′ = (a′1, . . . , a
′
n),
~b′ = (b′1, . . . , b
′
n) of each
of the n modes of HA,HB ,HA′ ,HB′ to u~a, u~b, u~a′, u~b′.
Here u denotes the complex conjugate of u and F2,2,n =
HA ⊗HB ⊗HA′ ⊗HB′ .
In Ref. [19], a full characterization of the symmetric
subspace F
U(n)
2,2,n is given. Let us introduce the four oper-
ators Z11, Z12, Z21, Z22 defined by:
Z11 =
n∑
i=1
a†i b
†
i , Z12 =
n∑
i=1
a†ia
′†
i ,
Z21 =
n∑
i=1
b†i b
′†
i , Z22 =
n∑
i=1
a′†i b
′†
i .
We now define the so-called SU(2, 2) generalized coherent
states [20, 21]: to any 2×2 complex matrix Λ = ( λ11 λ12λ21 λ22 )
such that ΛΛ† ≺ 12 (that is, with a spectral norm strictly
less than 1), we associate the 4n-mode Gaussian state
|Λ, n〉 = |Λ, 1〉⊗n given by
|Λ, n〉 = det(1 − ΛΛ†)n/2 exp

 2∑
i,j=1
λijZij

 |vacuum〉.
Since the polynomial
∑2
i,j=1 λijZij is quadratic in the
creation operators, the generalized coherent state is a
Gaussian state. More specifically, it corresponds to n
copies of a centered 4-mode pure Gaussian state whose
covariance matrix is a function of Λ (see the discussion
in Section 3 of Ref. [19] for details).
These generalized coherent states span the symmetric
subspace [19], and moreover, for n ≥ 4, they resolve the
identity on the symmetric subspace [19]:∫
D
|Λ, n〉〈Λ, n|dµn(Λ) = 1FU(n)2,2,n (3)
where D is the set of 2×2 matrices Λ such that ΛΛ† ≺ 12
and dµn(Λ) is the invariant measure on D given by
dµn(Λ) =
(n− 1)(n− 2)2(n− 3)
π4 det(12 − ΛΛ†)4 dλ11dλ12dλ21dλ22.
Since the space F
U(n)
2,2,n is infinite-dimensional, the in-
tegral of Eq. (3) is not normalizable. In order to ob-
tain an operator with finite norm, we consider the finite-
dimensional subspace F
U(n),≤K
2,2,n of F
U(n)
2,2,n spanned by
states with less than K “excitations”:
Span
{
(Z11)
i(Z12)
j(Z21)
k(Z22)
ℓ|vac〉 : i+ j + k + ℓ ≤ K} .
We show in Appendix C that an approximate resolu-
tion of the identity still holds for this space when re-
stricting the coherent states |Λ, n〉 to Λ ∈ Dη for Dη ={
Λ ∈ D : η12 − ΛΛ†  0
}
for η ∈ [0, 1[. Let us denote
by Π≤K the identity onto the subspace F
U(n),≤K
2,2,n and
introduce the relative entropy D(x||y) = x log xy + (1 −
x) log 1−x1−y .
Theorem 1. For n ≥ 5 and η ∈ [0, 1[, if K ≤ ηN1−η for
N = n− 5, then the operator inequality∫
Dη
|Λ, n〉〈Λ, n|dµn(Λ) ≥ (1− ε)Π≤K (4)
holds with ε = 2N4(1 +K/N)7 exp
(
−ND
(
K
K+N
∥∥η)).
This approximate resolution of the identity allows us
to bound the diamond norm of maps which are covariant
under the actionWu of the unitary group U(n), provided
that the total photon number of the input state is upper
bounded by some known value K. Let us define τηH to be
the normalized state corresponding to the left-hand side
of Eq. (4), and τηHN a purification of τ
η
H.
4Theorem 2. Let ∆ : End(F≤K1,1,n) → End(H′) such
that for all u ∈ U(n), there exists a CPTP map Ku :
End(H′)→ End(H′) such that ∆ ◦Wu = Ku ◦∆, then
‖∆‖⋄ ≤ K
4
50
‖(∆⊗ id)τηHN ‖1,
for η = K−n+5K+n−5 , provided that n ≥ N∗(K/(n− 5)).
The function N∗ is defined in Eq. (C6) and its ar-
gument is an upper bound on the average number of
photons per mode. One has for instance N∗(21) ≈ 104,
N∗(60) ≈ 105.
Similarly as in [4] for the case of permutation invari-
ance, Theorem 22 shows that one can obtain a polyno-
mial approximation of degree 4 (if the average number of
photons per mode is constant) of the diamond norm by
simply evaluating the trace norm of the map on a very
simple state, namely a purification of a mixture of Gaus-
sian i.i.d. states. We note that we restricted the analysis
to SU(2, 2) coherent states here because they are the rel-
evant ones for cryptographic applications, but our results
can be extended to SU(p, q) coherent states for arbitrary
integers p, q. In that case, the prefactor of the diamond
norm approximation would be a polynomial of degree pq.
Security reduction to Gaussian collective
attacks.—We now explain how to obtain a bound on
‖(∆⊗id)τηHN ‖1, if we already know that the initial proto-
col (without the energy test) is ε-secure against collective
attacks. Let us therefore assume that we are given such
a CV QKD protocol E0 acting on 2n-mode states shared
by Alice and Bob which is, in addition, covariant under
the action of the unitary group (i.e. there exists Ku such
that E0 ◦ Wu = Ku ◦ E0). Examples of such protocols
are the no-switching protocol [9] and the measurement-
device-independent protocol of Ref. [18], provided that
they are suitably symmetrized. We define E := R◦E0◦T ,
where R is an additional privacy amplification step that
reduces the key by ⌈2 log2
(
K+4
4
)⌉ bits.
Recall that by definition, the QKD protocol E0 is ε-
secure against Gaussian collective attacks if
‖((E0 −F0)⊗ id)(|Λ, n〉〈Λ, n|)‖1 ≤ ε
for all Λ ∈ D. It means that the protocol is shown to be
secure for input states of the form trHA′HB′ (|Λ, n〉〈Λ, n|),
which are nothing but i.i.d. bipartite Gaussian states. By
linearity, we immediately obtain that ‖(∆⊗ id)τηH‖1 ≤ ε.
To finish the proof, we need to take into account the
extra system N given to Eve. This system can be chosen
of dimension
(
K+4
4
)
and the leftover hashing lemma of
Renner [12] says that by shortening the final key of the
protocol by 2 log2(dimN ), one ensures that the protocol
remains ε-secure. This is the role of the map R. Overall,
we find that ‖((E − F)⊗ id)τηHN ‖1 ≤ ε.
Results.—Putting everything together, we show that
if E0 is covariant under the action of the unitary group
and ε-secure against Gaussian collective attacks, then the
protocol E = R◦E0◦T is ε′-secure against general attacks,
with
ε′ =
K4
50
ε (5)
for K = max
{
1, n(dA+dB)
(
1+2
√
ln(8/ε)
2n +
ln(8/ε)
n
)(
1−
2
√
ln(8/ε)
2k
)−1}
. The full proof is presented in Appendix
D. The advantage of our approach compared to the pre-
vious results of [11] is two-fold: first the improvement of
the prefactor in Eq. (5) from 2polylog(n) to O(n4) yields
security for practical settings; second, it is only required
to establish the security of the protocol against Gaussian
collective attacks in order to apply our security reduc-
tion, a task arguably much simpler than addressing the
security against collective attacks in the case of CV QKD.
Discussion.—Despite their wide range of application,
there is a regime where “standard” de Finetti theorems
fail, namely when the local dimension is not negligible
compared to the number n of subsystems [22]. In partic-
ular, these techniques do not apply directly to CV proto-
cols where the local spaces are infinite-dimensional Fock
spaces. In this work, we considered a natural symme-
try displayed by some important CV QKD protocols,
which are covariant under the action of beamsplitters
and phase-shifts on their n modes [16]. For such pro-
tocols, one legitimately expects that stronger versions of
de Finetti theorems should hold. In particular, a widely
held belief that it is enough to consider Gaussian i.i.d. in-
put states instead of all i.i.d. states in order to analyze
the security of the corresponding protocol.
We proved this statement rigorously here. Our main
tool is a family of SU(2, 2) generalized coherent states
that resolve the identity of the subspace spanned by
states invariant under the action of U(n). This implies
that in some applications such as QKD, it is sufficient to
consider the behaviour of the protocol on these states in
order to obtain guarantees that hold for arbitrary input
states.
Let us conclude by discussing the issue of active sym-
metrization. For the proof above to go through, it is
required that the protocols are covariant under the ac-
tion of the unitary group. Such an invariance can be
enforced by symmetrizing the classical data held by Al-
ice and Bob. However, this step is computationally costly
and it would be beneficial to bypass it. We believe that
this should be possible. Indeed, it is often argued that a
similar step is unnecessary when proving the security of
BB84 for instance, and there is no fundamental reason
to think that the situation is different here. Moreover,
we already know of security proofs based on the uncer-
tainty principle [23–25] where such a symmetrization is
not required.
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6Appendix
In Section A, we recall the main results from Ref. [19] about the symmetric subspace F
U(n)
2,2,n and the generalized
SU(2, 2) coherent states. In Section B, we present a series of technical lemmas and prove in Section C that bounded-
energy generalized coherent states approximately resolve the identity on F
U(n),≤K
2,2,n . In Section D, we explain how to
perform the security proof of the protocol and show that bounding the norm of ∆ = E −F decomposes into separate
tasks. In Section E, we derive our generalization of the de Finetti reduction of [4] to maps that are covariant under the
action of the unitary group U(n). In Section F, we show how to reduce the security analysis against general attacks to
a security analysis against Gaussian collective attacks, if the photon number of the input states is bounded. Finally,
in Section G, we analyze the energy test and show how it provides the restriction on the input states required for the
proof of Section F to go through.
Appendix A: The symmetric subspace F
U(n)
2,2,n and generalized SU(2, 2) coherent states
In this section, we recall some results from Ref. [19] where the symmetric subspace F
U(n)
p,q,n is considered for arbitrary
integers p, q and specialize them to the case where p = q = 2.
1. The symmetric subspace F
U(n)
2,2,n
Let HA ∼= HB ∼= HA′ ∼= HB′ ∼= Cn and define the Fock space F2,2,n as
F2,2,n :=
∞⊕
k=0
Symk(HA ⊗HB ⊗HA′ ⊗HB′),
where Symk(H) is the symmetric part of H⊗k.
In this paper, we will use both the standard Hilbert representation and the Segal-Bargmann representation of
F2,2,n. Using the Segal-Bargmann representation, the Hilbert space F2,2,n is realized as a functional space of complex
holomorphic functions square-integrable with respect to a Gaussian measure, F2,2,n ∼= L2hol(C4n, ‖ · ‖), with a state
ψ ∈ F2,2,n represented by a holomorphic function ψ(z, z′) with z ∈ C2n, z′ ∈ C2n satisfying
‖ψ‖2 := 〈ψ, ψ〉 = 1
π4n
∫
exp(−|z|2 − |z′|2)|ψ(z, z′)|2dzdz′ <∞ (A1)
where dz :=
∏n
k=1
∏2
i=1 dzk,i and dz
′ :=
∏n
k=1
∏2
j=1 dz
′
k,j denote the Lebesgue measures on C
2n and C2n, respectively,
and |z|2 :=∑nk=1∑2i=1 |zk,i|2, |z′|2 :=∑nk=1∑2j=1 |z′k,j |2. A state ψ is therefore described as a holomorphic function
of 4n complex variables (z1,1, zn,1; z1,2, . . . , zn,2; z
′
1,1, . . . , z
′
n,1; z
′
1,2, . . . , z
′
n,2). In the following, we denote by zi and z
′
j
the vectors (z1,i, . . . , zn,i) and (z
′
1,j, . . . , z
′
n,j), respectively, for i, j ∈ {1, 2}. With these notations, the vector z1 is
associated to the space HA, the vector z
′
1 to HB , the vector z2 to H
′
B and the vector z
′
2 to H
′
A. These notations are
chosen so that the unitary u ∈ U(n) acts as u on z1, z2, and u on z′1, z′2.
LetB(F2,2,n) denote the set of bounded linear operators from F2,2,n to itself and let S(F2,2,n) be the set of quantum
states on F2,2,n: positive semi-definite operators with unit trace.
Formally, one can switch from the Segal-Bargmann representation to the representation in terms of annihihation
and creation operators by replacing the variables zk,1 by a
†
k, zk,2 by b
′†
k , z
′
k,1 by b
†
k and z
′
k,2 by a
′†
k . The function
f(z, z′) is therefore replaced by an operator f(a†, b†, a′†, b′†) and the corresponding state in the Fock basis is obtained
by applying this operator to the vacuum state.
The metaplectic representation of the unitary group U(n) ⊂ Sp(2n,R) on F2,2,n associates to u ∈ U(n) the operator
Wu performing the change of variables z → uz, z′ → uz′:
U(n)→ B(F2,2,n)
u 7→Wu =
[
ψ(z1, z2, z
′
1, z
′
2) 7→ ψ(uz1, uz2, uz′1, uz′2)
]
where u denotes the complex conjugate of the unitary matrix u. In other words, the unitary u is applied to the modes
of FA ⊗ FB′ and its complex conjugate is applied to those of FB ⊗ FA′ .
The states that are left invariant under the action of the unitary group U(n) are relevant for instance in the context
of continuous-variable quantum key distribution, and we define the symmetric subspace as the space spanned by such
invariant states.
7Definition 3 (Symmetric subspace). For integer n ≥ 1, the symmetric subspace FU(n)2,2,n is the subspace of functions
ψ ∈ F2,2,n such that
Wuψ = ψ ∀u ∈ U(n).
The name symmetric subspace is inspired by the name given to the subspace Symn(Cd) of (Cd)⊗n of states invariant
under permutation of the subsystems:
Symn(Cd) :=
{|ψ〉 ∈ (Cd)⊗n : P (π)|ψ〉 = |ψ〉, ∀π ∈ Sn} (A2)
where π 7→ P (π) is a representation of the permutation group Sn on (Cd)⊗n and P (π) is the operator that permutes
the n factors of the state according to π ∈ Sn. See for instance [26] for a recent exposition of the symmetric subspace
from a quantum information perspective.
In [19], a full characterization of the symmetric subspace F
U(n)
2,2,n is given. It is helpful to introduce the four operators
Z11, Z12, Z21, Z22 defined by:
Z11 =
n∑
i=1
zi,1z
′
i,1 ↔
n∑
i=1
a†i b
†
i
Z12 =
n∑
i=1
zi,1z
′
i,2 ↔
n∑
i=1
a†ia
′†
i ,
Z21 =
n∑
i=1
zi,2z
′
i,1 ↔
n∑
i=1
b†i b
′†
i ,
Z22 =
n∑
i=1
zi,2z
′
i,2 ↔
n∑
i=1
a′†i b
′†
i .
Definition 4. For integer n ≥ 1, let E2,2,n be the space of analytic functions ψ of the 4 variables Z1,1, . . . , Z2,2,
satisfying ‖ψ‖2E <∞, that is E2,2,n = L2hol(Cpq, ‖ · ‖E).
In [19], is was proven that E2,2,n coincides with the symmetric subspace F
U(n)
2,2,n .
Theorem 5. For n ≥ 2, the symmetric subspace FU(n)2,2,n is isomorphic to E2,2,n.
In other words, any state in the symmetric subspace can be written as
|ψ〉 = f( n∑
i=1
a†i b
†
i ,
n∑
i=1
a†ia
′†
i ,
n∑
i=1
b†i b
′†
i ,
n∑
i=1
a′†i b
′†
i
)|vacuum〉
for some function f . Said otherwise, such a state is characterized by only 4 parameters instead of 4n for an arbitrary
state in F2,2,n; or else, the symmetric subspace is isomorphic to a 4-mode Fock space (with “creation” operators
corresponding to Z11, Z12, Z21, Z22, instead of the ambient 4n-mode Fock space.
2. Coherent states for SU(2, 2)/SU(2) × SU(2)× U(1)
In this section, we first review a construction due to Perelomov that associates a family of generalized coherent
states to general Lie groups [20], [21]. In this language, the standard Glauber coherent states are associated with the
Heisenberg-Weyl group, while the atomic spin coherent states are associated with SU(2). The symmetric subspace
F
U(n)
2,2,n is spanned by SU(2, 2) coherent states, where SU(2, 2) is the special unitary group of signature (2, 2) over C:
SU(2, 2) :=
{
A ∈M4(C) : A12,2A† = 12,2
}
(A3)
where M4(C) is the set of 4× 4-complex matrices and 12,2 = 12 ⊕ (−12).
In Perelomov’s construction, a system of coherent states of type (T, |ψ0〉) where T is the representation of some
group G acting on some Hilbert space H ∋ |ψ0〉, is the set of states {|ψg〉 : |ψg〉 = Tg|ψ0〉} where g runs over all the
group G. One defines H , the stationary subgroup of |ψ0〉 as
H := {g ∈ G : Tg|ψ0〉 = α|ψ0〉 for |α| = 1} ,
8that is the group of h ∈ G such that |ψh〉 and |ψ0〉 differ only by a phase factor. When G is a connected noncompact
simple Lie group, H is the maximal subgroup of G. In particular, for G = SU(2, 2), one has H = SU(2, 2) ∩ U(4) =
SU(2) × SU(2) × U(1) and the factor space G/H corresponds to a Hermitian symmetric space of classical type
(see e.g. Chapter X of [27]). The generalized coherent states are parameterized by points in G/H . For G/H =
SU(2, 2)/SU(2)×SU(2)×U(1), the factor space is the set D of 2×2 matrices Λ such that ΛΛ† < 1p, i.e. the singular
values of Λ are strictly less than 1.
D = {Λ ∈M2(C) : 12 − ΛΛ† > 0} ,
where A > 0 for a Hermitian matrix A means that A is positive definite.
We are now ready to define our coherent states for the noncompact Lie group SU(2, 2).
Definition 6 (SU(2, 2) coherent states). For n ≥ 1, the coherent state ψΛ,n associated with Λ ∈ D is given by
ψΛ,n(Z1,1, . . . , Z2,2) = det(1− ΛΛ†)n/2 det exp(ΛTZ)
where Z is the 2× 2 matrix [Zi,j]i,j∈{1,2}.
In the following, we will sometimes abuse notation and write ψΛ instead of ψΛ,n, when the parameter n is clear
from context.
We note that the coherent states have a tensor product form in the sense that
ψΛ,n = ψ
⊗n
Λ,1.
We will also write |Λ, n〉 = |Λ, 1〉⊗n for ψΛ,n. Such a state is called identically and independently distributed (i.i.d.)
in the quantum information literature.
The main feature of a family of coherent states is that they resolve the identity. This is the case with the SU(2, 2)
coherent states introduced above: see Ref. [19].
Theorem 7 (Resolution of the identity). For n ≥ 4, the coherent states resolve the identity over the symmetric
subspace F
U(n)
2,2,n : ∫
D
|Λ, n〉〈Λ, n|dµn(Λ) = 1FU(n)2,2,n ,
where dµn(Λ) is the invariant measure on D given by
dµn(Λ) =
(n− 1)(n− 2)2(n− 3)
π4 det(12 − ΛΛ†)4
2∏
i=1
2∏
j=1
dR(Λi,j)dI(Λi,j), (A4)
where R(Λi,j) and I(Λi,j) refer respectively to the real and imaginary parts of Λi,j. This operator equality is to be
understood for the weak operator topology.
Appendix B: Technical lemmas
In this section, we prove or recall a number of technical results that will be useful for analyzing the finite energy
version of the de Finetti theorem in C.
1. Tail bounds
For positive integers k, n > 0, the Beta and regularized (incomplete) Beta functions are given respectively by
B(k, n) =
∫ 1
0
tk−1(1− t)n−1dt = (k − 1)!(n− 1)!
(n+ k − 1)! , B(x; k, n) =
∫ x
0
tk−1(1− t)n−1dt,
for x > 0. Finally, the regularized Beta function is defined as
Ix(k, n) =
B(x; k, n)
B(k, n)
.
Let us recall the Chernoff bound for a sum of independent Bernoulli variables.
9Theorem 8 (Chernoff bound). Let X1, . . . , Xn be independent random variables on {0, 1} with Pr[Xi = 1] = p, for
i = 1, . . . , n. Set X =
∑n
i=1Xi. Then for any t ∈ [0, 1− p], we have
Pr[X ≥ (p+ t)n] ≤ exp (−nD(p+ t||p)) ,
where the relative entropy is defined as D(x||y) = x log xy + (1 − x) log 1−x1−y .
Pinsker’s inequality gives a lower bound on D(x||y) as a function of the total variation distance between the two
probability distributions.
Lemma 9 (Pinsker’s inequality). For 0 < y < x < 1, it holds that
D(x‖y) ≥ 2
ln 2
(x− y)2.
We now prove a tail bound for the regularized Beta function.
Lemma 10 (Tail bound for regularized Beta function). For integers k, n > 0, it holds that
1− Iη(k, n) ≤ exp
(
−(n+ k − 1)D
(
k − 2
n+ k − 1‖η
))
,
provided that η ≥ (k − 2)/(n+ k − 1).
Proof. The incomplete Beta function can be related to the tail of the binomial distribution as follows:
1− Iη(k, n) = F (k − 1, n+ k − 1, η) (B1)
where F (K,N, p) is the probability that there are at most K successes when drawing N times from a Bernoulli
distribution with success probability p. Equivalently, if Xi are {0, 1}-random variables such that Pr[Xi = 1] = 1 − p
for i = 1, . . . , n, then
F (K,N, p) = Pr[X ≥ N −K + 1],
where X =
∑n
i=1Xi. The Chernoff bound of Theorem 8 yields
F (K,N, p) ≤ exp (−ND(1− p+ t||1− p))
for t = p− K−1N , provided that N −K +1 ≥ (1− p)N , i.e. p ≥ (K − 1)/N or η ≥ (K − 1)/N . Taking K = k− 1, N =
n+ k − 1 and p = η, and injecting into Eq. (B1), gives
1− Iη(k, n) ≤ exp
(
−(n+ k − 1)D
(
1− k − 2
n+ k − 1 ||1− η
))
≤ exp
(
−(n+ k − 1)D
(
k − 2
n+ k − 1 ||η
))
,
which holds provided that η ≥ (k − 2)/(n+ k − 1). This proves the claim.
2. Energy cutoff
The resolution of the identity of Theorem 7 involves operators which are not trace-class, as well as coherent states
with arbitrary large energy. The natural solution to get operators with finite norm is to replace the domain D by a
cut-off versions Dη defined by
Dη :=
{
Λ ∈Mp,q(C) : η1p − ΛΛ† ≥ 0
}
,
for η ∈ [0, 1[. Note that
lim
η→1
Dη = D.
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The integration over Dη can then be performed by first integrating the measure dµn(Λ) on the “polar variables”, and
only later on the “radial” variables corresponding to the singular values of Λ.
For a fixed pair of squared singular values (x, y), let Vx,y be the set of matrices Λ ∈ D with squared singular values
(x, y), i.e.,
Vx,y :=
{
u
[√x 0
0
√
y
]
v† : u, v ∈ U(2)
}
.
We further define the operator Px,y corresponding to the integral of |Λ, n〉〈Λ, n| over Vx,y:
Px,y :=
∫
Vx,y
|Λ, n〉〈Λ, n|dµx,y(Λ) ≥ 0 (B2)
where dµx,y(Λ) is the Haar measure on Vx,y and the normalization is chosen so that trPx,y = 1.
We have the following equivalent version of the resolution of the identity of Theorem 7.
Theorem 11. For n ≥ 4, it holds that: ∫ 1
0
∫ 1
0
q(x, y)Px,ydxdy = 1FU(n)2,2,n
,
where the distribution q(x, y) is given by
q(x, y) :=
(n− 1)(n− 2)2(n− 3)(x− y)2
2(1− x)4(1 − y)4 . (B3)
Proof. We wish to integrate |Λ, n〉〈Λ, n|dµn(Λ) over the “polar” variables. For this, we perform the singular value
decomposition of Λ, which reads Λ = uΣv†, where u, v ∈ U(2) and Σ = diag(σ1, σ2), with σ1, σ2 ∈ [0, 1[.
The Jacobian for the singular value decomposition is [28]:
dΛ = (σ21 − σ21)2σ1σ2(u†du)dΣ(v†dv). (B4)
Exploiting this Jacobian and performing the change of variables x = σ21 , y = σ
2
2 , one obtains that the resolution of
the identity of Theorem 7 can be written:
C
∫ 1
0
dx
∫ 1
0
dy
(x− y)2
(1 − x)4(1− y)4Px,y = 1FU(n)2,2,n ,
for the appropriate constant C. Here, we have used that det(12 − ΛΛ†)4 = (1− x)4(1− y)4 for any Λ ∈ Vx,y.
The constant C can be determined by considering the overlap between 1
F
U(n)
2,2,n
and the vacuum state:
1 = 〈0|1
F
U(n)
2,2,n
|0〉
= C
∫ 1
0
dx
∫ 1
0
dy
∫
(x− y)2
(1− x)4(1− y)4
〈
0
∣∣u[√x 00 √y ]v†, n〉〈u[√x 00 √y ]v†, n∣∣0〉dudv
= C
∫ 1
0
dx
∫ 1
0
dy
(x− y)2
(1− x)4(1 − y)4 (1− x)
n(1− y)n
∫
dudv
= C
∫ 1
0
dx
∫ 1
0
dy
(x− y)2
(1− x)4(1 − y)4 (1− x)
n(1− y)n
= C
2
(n− 1)(n− 2)2(n− 3) ,
where we used that
〈
0
∣∣u[√x 00 √y ]v†, n〉 = (1 − x)n/2(1 − y)n/2 for any u, v ∈ U(2) and that the measures du and dv
are normalized.
Let K ≥ 0 be an integer. We define V=K as the subspace of FU(n)2,2,n spanned by vectors with K pairs of excitations:
VK := Span{Zi1,1Zj1,2Zk2,1Zℓ2,2|0〉 : i+ j + k + ℓ = K; i, j, k, ℓ ∈ N},
and the projector Π=K to be the orthogonal projector onto V=K . Physically, this is the subspace of the Fock space
restricted to states containing 2K photons in total in the 4n optical modes.
Moreover, let us denote by ank :=
(
n+k−1
k
)
the number of configurations of k particles in n modes.
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Lemma 12. For K ∈ N and x, y ∈ [0, 1[, we have
tr [Π=KPx,y] =
∑
k1+k2=K
ank1a
n
k2(1− x)n(1− y)nxk1yk2 .
Proof. The total photon number distribution of a state |Λ, n〉 is invariant under local unitaries u, v ∈ U(2) applied on
the creation operators of FA or FB. This means that this distribution only depends on the squared singular values of
the matrix Λ. In particular, denoting by |(√x,√y), n〉 the coherent state corresponding to the matrix diag(√x,√y),
we obtain:
tr [Π=KPx,y] = 〈(
√
x,
√
y), n|Π=K |(
√
x,
√
y), n〉.
Since this coherent state is given by
|(√x,√y), n〉 := (1− x)n/2(1− y)n/2 exp(√xZ11) exp(√yZ22),
it implies that
tr [Π=KPx,y] =
∑
k1+k2=K
ank1a
n
k2(1− x)n(1− y)nxk1yk2 .
Let us define the operator P η as
P η :=
∫
D\Dη
|Λ, n〉〈Λ, n|dµn(Λ).
Lemma 13. For n ≥ 38, K ∈ N and η ∈ [0, 1[ such that K ≤ η1−η (n− 5), it holds that
tr(Π=KP η) ≤ 2N4(1 + α)7 exp
(
−ND
(
α
α+ 1
∥∥η)) ,
where N = n− 5 and α := K/N .
Proof. For any non negative distribution f(x, y) ≥ 0 symmetric in x and y, i.e. such that f(x, y) = f(y, x), it holds
that ∫
Eη
f(x, y)dxdy ≤ 2
∫ 1
η
dx
∫ 1
0
dyf(x, y).
Since q(x, y)tr [P=KΠx,y] is such a distribution, it holds that
tr(Π=KP η) ≤ 2
∫ 1
η
dx
∫ 1
0
dyq(x, y) tr [P=KΠx,y] .
Lemma 12 then yields
tr(Π=KP η) ≤ 2
∑
k1+k2=K
ank1a
n
k2
∫ 1
η
dx(1 − x)nxk1
∫ 1
0
dyq(x, y)(1− y)nyk2
≤ (n− 1)(n− 2)2(n− 3)
∑
k1+k2=K
ank1a
n
k2
∫ 1
η
dx(1− x)n−4xk1
∫ 1
0
dy(x− y)2(1− y)n−4yk2
≤ (n− 1)(n− 2)2(n− 3)
∑
k1+k2=K
ank1a
n
k2
∫ 1
η
dx(1− x)n−4xk1
∫ 1
0
dy(1− y)n−4yk2
where we used the trivial bound (x− y)2 ≤ 1 for 0 ≤ x, y ≤ 1 in the last inequality.
The normalization of the Beta function reads∫ 1
0
(1− y)nykdy = k!n!
(n+ k + 1)!
,
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which gives
tr(Π=KP η) ≤ (n− 2)
∑
k1+k2=K
(n+ k2 − 1)(n+ k2 − 2)
∫ 1
η
ank1(1− x)n−4xk1dx (B5)
Lemma 10 allows us to bound the integral:
∫ 1
η
an−4k1 (1 − x)n−4xk1dx ≤ exp
(
−(n+ k1 − 5)D
(
n− 3
n+ k1 − 5
∥∥1− η)) , (B6)
provided that 1− η ≤ (n− 3)/(n+ k1 − 5).
If n−5n+K−5 ≥ 1− η, this term can be bounded uniformly as∫ 1
η
an−4k1 (1− x)n−4xk1dx ≤ exp
(
−ND
(
N
N +K
∥∥1− η)) ,
where we defined N := n− 5. Injecting this in Eq. (B5), we obtain
tr(Π=KP η) ≤ (N + 3)
∑
k1+k2=K
(N + k2 + 4)(N + k2 + 3)
(N + k1 + 4)!N !
(N + k1)!(N + 4)!
exp
(
−ND
(
N
N +K
∥∥1− η))
≤ (K + 1)(N +K + 4)
6
(N + 1)3
exp
(
−ND
(
N
N +K
∥∥1− η)) (B7)
Imposing in addition that N ≥ 4, i.e. n ≥ 9, so that N +K + 4 ≤ 2(N +K), one finally obtains the bound:
tr(Π=KP η) ≤ 64(N +K)
7
N3
exp
(
−ND
(
N
N +K
∥∥1− η)) .
One can get a better bound by choosing N ≥ 33, i.e. n ≥ 38: in that case, one can check that for any K ≥ 0, it holds
that (
1 +
4
N +K
)6
≤ 2,
which gives (N +K + 4)6 ≤ 2(N +K)6. Injecting this into Eq. (B7) yields
tr(Π=KP η) ≤ 2(N +K)
7
N3
exp
(
−ND
(
N
N +K
∥∥1− η)) .
Lemma 14. For any nonnnegative operator A ≥ 0 and projector Π with rank(Π) <∞, it holds that:
ΠAΠ ≤ tr[ΠA]Π.
Proof. The support of ΠAΠ is contained in that of tr[ΠA]Π. Since both operators are positive semi-definite, the only
thing we need to prove is that for any λ ∈ spec(ΠAΠ), it holds that
λ ≤ tr[ΠA]
since all the nonzero eigenvalues of tr[ΠA]Π are equal to tr[ΠA]. The sum of the eingenvalues of an operator is equal
to its trace, which gives ∑
λ∈spec(ΠAΠ)
λ = tr(ΠAΠ).
Moreover, since all these eigenvalues are nonnegative, we have that λmax(ΠAΠ) ≤
∑
λ∈spec(ΠAΠ) λ, which concludes
the proof.
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Appendix C: Finite energy version of de Finetti theorem
In this section, we establish a de Finetti reduction, similar to the one obtained in [4] in the case of permutation
invariance. Such a reduction uses as a main tool as statement analogous to the resolution of the identity
1Sym ≤ Cn,d
∫
(|φ〉〈φ|)⊗n dµ(φ)
where C(n, d) is a polynomial in n provided the local dimension d is finite.
In the case of continuous-variable protocols, the local dimension is infinite and we need to find a better reduction.
This is indeed possible provided we have bounds on the maximum energy (or total number of photons) of the states
under consideration.
For η ∈ [0, 1[, define the sets Eη = [0, η]× [0, η] and Eη = [0, 1[2\Eη.
We introduce the following positive operators
Pη :=
∫
Eη
q(x, y)Px,ydxdy =
∫
Dη
|Λ, n〉〈Λ, n|dµn(Λ), (C1)
P η :=
∫
Eη
q(x, y)Px,ydxdy =
∫
D\Dη
|Λ, n〉〈Λ, n|dµn(Λ), (C2)
where the equalities follow from the fact that one can integrate over Dη by first integrating over Vx,y and then over
Eη. We recall that the operator Pxy is defined in Eq. (B2) and that the distribution q(x, y) is defined in Eq. (B3).
The resolution of the identity over F
U(n)
2,2,n (Theorem 7) immediately implies that
Pη + P η = 1FU(n)2,2,n
.
Let K ≥ 0 be an integer. We recall that V=K is the subspace of FU(n)2,2,n spanned by vectors with K pairs of
excitations:
VK := Span{Zi1,1Zj1,2Zk2,1Zℓ2,2|0〉 : i+ j + k + ℓ = K; i, j, k, ℓ ∈ N}.
The subspace V≤K is defined as V≤K :=
⊕K
k=0 V=k. The projector Π=K is the orthogonal projector onto V=K and
the projector Π≤K is defined as
Π≤K :=
K∑
k=0
Π=k.
Theorem 15 (Finite energy version of de Finetti theorem (Theorem 1 from the main text)). For n ≥ 5 and η ∈ [0, 1[,
if K ≤ η1−η (n− 5), then the following operator inequality holds∫
Dη
|Λ, n〉〈Λ, n|dµn(Λ) ≥ (1− ε)Π≤K
with
ε := 2N4(1 + α)7 exp
(
−ND
(
α
α+ 1
∥∥η)) .
for α = K/N and N = n− 5.
In particular, choosing K such that α = 1+η1−η =
K
N and using Pinsker’s inequality (Lemma 9) yields
ε ≤ 2(N +K)
7
N3
exp
(
− 2N
3
(N +K)2 ln 2
)
.
Proof of Theorem 15. The resolution of the identity reads∫
Eη
Px,yq(x, y)dxdy +
∫
Eη
Px,yq(x, y)dxdy = 1FU(n)2,2,n
=
∞∑
k=0
Π=k.
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For all k ≤ K, the projector Π=k can be written as:
Π=k =
∫
Eη
Π=kPx,yΠ=kq(x, y)dxdy +
∫
Eη
Π=kPx,yΠ=kq(x, y)dxdy.
In particular, since k ≤ K ≤ η1−η (n− 5), we have∫
Eη
Px,yq(x, y)dxdy ≥
∫
Eη
Π=kPx,yΠ=kq(x, y)dxdy
≥ Π=k −
∫
Eη
Π=kPx,yΠ=kq(x, y)dxdy
≥ Π=k −
∫
Eη
tr[Π=kPx,y]Π=kq(x, y)dxdy (C3)
≥ (1− ε)Π=k (C4)
where we used Lemma 14 in Eq. (C3) and the upper bound resulting from Lemma 13:∫
Eη
tr [Π=kPx,y] q(x, y)dxdy ≤ ε
in Eq. (C4). It follows that: ∫
Eη
Px,yq(x, y)dxdy ≥ (1− ε)Π=k
for all k ≤ K. This finally implies that∫
Eη
Px,yq(x, y)dxdy ≥ (1− ε)
∑
k≤K
Π=k = (1− ε)Π≤K .
The crucial property of Theorem 15 that will be important for application is that the volume of Dη is finite, and
scales as a low degree polynomial in n and K.
Theorem 16. For n ≥ 38, K ≥ n− 5 and η = K−n+5K+n−5 , it holds that
T (n, η) := tr
∫
Dη
|Λ, n〉〈Λ, n|dµn(Λ) ≤ K
4
100
.
Proof. The volume of Dη is given by
tr
∫
Dη
|Λ, n〉〈Λ, n|dµn(Λ) =
∫ η
0
∫ η
0
q(x, y)dxdy
=
(n− 1)(n− 2)2(n− 3)η4
12(1− η)4
≤ n
4η4
12(1− η)4
≤ n
4(1 + η)4
192(1− η)4
where we used that η ≤ (1 + η)/2 in the last equation.
In particular, choosing K such that η = K−n+5K+n−5 gives
1+η
1−η =
K
n−5 , and therefore
tr
∫
Dη
|Λ, n〉〈Λ, n|dµn(Λ) ≤ n
4K4
192(n− 5)4 .
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For n ≥ 38, it holds that 1192
(
n
n−5
)4
≤ 1100 , which finally gives
tr
∫
Dη
|Λ, n〉〈Λ, n|dµn(Λ) ≤ K
4
100
.
For future reference, let us not that that under the same assumptions as in the theorem, the following inequality
also holds:
T (n, η) + 1 ≤ K
4
100
. (C5)
This inequality will later be useful to analyze Eq. (D5) at the end of Section D and obtain Eq. (5) in the main text.
In other words, the volume T (n, η) of Dη is upper bounded by a polynomial of degree 4 in the number of modes
(or equivalently in the total energy).
Let us define the function N∗ : [1,∞[→ N such that
N∗(α) = max
{
38,min
{
N ∈ N : 2(1 + α)7N4 exp
(
− 2N
(1 + α)2 ln 2
)
≤ 1
2
}}
. (C6)
For instance, N∗(21) ≈ 104, N∗(60) ≈ 105.
We obtain:
Corollary 17. For K ≥ n− 5, if n ≥ N∗( Kn−5)− 5 then, for η∗ = K−n+5K+n−5 , it holds that∫
Dη∗
|Λ, n〉〈Λ, n|dµn(Λ) ≥ 1
2
Π≤K
tr
∫
Dη∗
|Λ, n〉〈Λ, n|dµn(Λ) ≤ K
4
100
.
Appendix D: Security proof for a modified CV QKD protocol
In this section, we recall some facts about security proofs for QKD protocols and explain how to obtain a secure
protocol from an initial protocol E0 known to be secure against Gaussian collective attacks, by prepending an energy
test and adding an additional privacy amplification test. These various steps will then be detailed in the subsequent
sections.
QKD protocols and their security.— A QKD protocol is a CP map from the infinite-dimensional Hilbert space
(HA ⊗ HB)⊗n, corresponding to the initially distributed entanglement, to the set of pairs (SA, SB) of ℓ-bit strings
(Alice and Bob’s final keys, respectively) and C, a transcript of the classical communication. In order to assess the
security of a given QKD protocol E in a composable framework, one compares it with an ideal protocol [1, 29]. The
action of an ideal protocol F is defined by concatenating the protocol E with a map S taking (SA, SB, C) as input
and outputting the triplet (S, S, C) where the string S is a perfect secret key (uniformly distributed and unknown
to Eve) with the same length as SA, that is F = S ◦ E . Then, a protocol will be called ǫ-secure if the advantage in
distinguishing it from an ideal version is not larger than ǫ. This advantage is quantified by (one half of) the diamond
norm defined by
||E − F||⋄ := sup
ρABE
‖(E − F)⊗ idK(ρABE)‖1 , (D1)
where the supremum is taken over density operators on (HA ⊗HB)⊗n ⊗K for any auxiliary system K. The diamond
norm is also known as the completely bounded trace norm and quantifies a notion of distinguishability for quantum
maps [2].
Our main technical result is a reduction of the security against general attacks to that against Gaussian collective
attacks, for which security has already been proved in earlier work, for instance in [10]. Let us therefore suppose
that our CV QKD protocol of interest, E0, is secure against Gaussian collective attacks. We will slightly modify it
by prepending an initial test T . More precisely, T is a CP map taking a state in a slightly larger Hilbert space,
(HA ⊗HB)⊗(n+k), applying a random unitary u ∈ U(n+ k) to it (corresponding to a network of beamsplitters and
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phaseshifters), measuring the last k modes and comparing the measurement outcome to a threshold fixed in advance.
The test succeeds if the measurement outcome (related to the energy) is small, meaning that the global state is
compatible with a state containing only a low number of photons per mode. Such a state is well-described in a low
dimensional Hilbert space, as we will discuss in Section G. Depending on the outcome of the test, either the protocol
aborts, or one applies the original protocol E0 on the n remaining modes.
For the test to be practical, it is important that the legitimate parties do not have to physically implement the
transformation u ∈ U(n+k). Rather, they can both measure their n+k modes with heterodyne detection, perform a
random rotation of their respective classical vector in R2(n+k) according to u ∈ U(n+k) ∼= O(2(n+k))∩Sp(2(n+k)).
In this paper, we assume that this symmetrization step is performed, as it is anyway required for the security
proof of the protocol against collective attacks [10]. We believe, however, that this step might not be required for
establishing the security of the protocol and leave it as an important open question for future work. In particular,
recent proof techniques in discrete-variable QKD have shown that the permutation need not be applied in practice
[24].
In section E, we will prove a de Finetti reduction that allows to upper bound the diamond distance between two
quantum channels, provided that they display the right invariance under the action of the unitary group U(n) and
that the input states have a maximum number of photons. We address this second issue by introducing another CP
map P which projects a state acting on F1,1,n = (HA ⊗HB)⊗n onto a low-dimensional Hilbert space F≤K1,1,n with less
than K photons overall in the 2n modes shared by Alice and Bob. Here, the value of K scales linearly with n.
Let us denote by E0 a CV QKD proven ε-secure against Gaussian collective attacks, for instance as in [10]. This
means that (see Section F for details)
‖((E0 −F0)⊗ 1)(|Λ, n〉〈Λ, n|)‖1 ≤ ε, (D2)
for any generalized coherent state |Λ, n〉. Here F0 := S ◦ E0 and S is a map that replaces the output key of E0 by an
independent and uniformly distributed string of length ℓ when E0 did not abort, and does nothing otherwise.
Here E0 maps an arbitrary density operator ρAB ∈ S(F1,1,n) to a state ρSA,SB,C where the registers are all classical
and store respectively Alice’s final key, Bob’s final key and a transcript of the classical communication.
Let us define the following maps:
T : B(F1,1,n+k)→ B(F1,1,n)⊗ {passes/aborts},
P : B(F1,1,n)→ B(F≤K1,1,n),
R : {0, 1}ℓ × {0, 1}ℓ → {0, 1}ℓ′ × {0, 1}ℓ′,
where
• T (k, dA, dB) takes as input an arbitrary state ρAB on F1,1,n+k, maps it to VuρABV †u where the unitary u is
chosen from the Haar measure on U(n+ k), measures the last k modes for A and B with heterodyne detection
and check whether the measurement outputs pass the test if the k outcomes α1, · · · , αk of Alice and β1, · · · , βk
of Bob satisfy
k∑
i=1
|αi|2 ≤ kdA and
k∑
i=1
|βi|2 ≤ kdB .
If they pass the test, the map returns the state on the first n modes (that were not measured) as well as the
flag “passes”. Otherwise, it returns the vacuum state and the flag “aborts”.
• P is the projector onto the finite-dimensional subspace F≤K1,1,n (corresponding to states with at most K photons
in the 2n modes): it maps any state ρ ∈ B(F1,1,n) to Π≤KρΠ≤K ∈ B(F≤K1,1,n). This trace non-increasing map
is introduced as a technical tool for the security analysis but need not be implemented in practice. It simply
ensures that the states that are fed to the original QKD protocol E0 live in a finite-dimensional subspace. In
the text, we will alternatively denote this projection by P≤K or P(n,K), depending on which parameters we
wish to make explicit.
• R takes two ℓ-bit strings as input and returns ℓ′-bit strings (for ℓ′ < ℓ).
We finally define our CV QKD protocol E as
E = R ◦ E0 ◦ T
and the ideal protocol as F = S ◦ E . Abusing notation slightly, the map S now acts on strings of length ℓ′ instead of
ℓ.
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Lemma 18. Let E be the protocol R◦ E0 where the inputs are restricted to the finite-dimensional subspace B(F≤K1,1,n),
and F = S ◦ E. Then the security of E implies the security of E:
||E − F||⋄ ≤ ||E − F||⋄ + 2||(1− P) ◦ T ||⋄, (D3)
provided that the quantity ||(1− P) ◦ T ||⋄ can be made arbitrarily small.
Proof. We define (virtual) protocols E˜ := R ◦ E0 ◦ P and F˜ := S ◦ E˜ . The security of the protocol E is then a
consequence of the following derivation:
||E − F||⋄ ≤ ||E˜ ◦ T − F˜ ◦ T ||⋄ + ||E − E˜ ◦ T ||⋄ + ||F − F˜ ◦ T ||⋄
≤ ||(E˜ − F˜) ◦ T ||⋄ + ||R ◦ E0 ◦ (id− P) ◦ T ||⋄ + ||S ◦ R ◦ E0 ◦ (id− P) ◦ T ||⋄
≤ ||E˜ − F˜||⋄ + 2||(1− P) ◦ T ||⋄, (D4)
where we used the triangle inequality and the fact that the CP maps T , R ◦ E0 and S cannot increase the diamond
norm.
Since E ◦ P = E˜ and P is trace non-increasing, we finally obtain that
||E − F||⋄ ≤ ||E − F||⋄ + 2||(1− P) ◦ T ||⋄.
Bounding the two terms in the right hand side of Eq. (D3) is done with the two following theorems, which will be
proven in Sections F and G, respectively.
Theorem 19. With the previous notations, if E0 is ε-secure against Gaussian collective attacks, then
||E − F||⋄ ≤ 2T (n, η)ε
where T (n, η) = (n− 1)(n− 2)2(n− 3) η412(1−η)4 and E = R ◦ E0 ◦ P≤K.
Theorem 20. For integers n, k ≥ 1, and dA, dB > 0, define K = n(d′A + d′B) for d′A/B = dA/Bg(n, k, ε/4) for the
function g defined in Eq. (G1). Then
∥∥(
1− P(n,K)) ◦ T (k, dA, dB)∥∥⋄ ≤ ε.
Putting everything together yields our main result.
Theorem 21. If the protocol E0 is ε-secure against Gaussian collective attacks, then the protocol E = R ◦ E0 ◦ P is
ε′-secure against general attacks with
ε′ ≤ 2T (n, η)ε+ ε.
Putting everything together, we show that if E0 is covariant under the action of the unitary group and ε-secure
against Gaussian collective attacks, then the protocol E = R ◦ E0 ◦ T is ε′-secure against general attacks, with
ε′ = 2ε(T (n, η) + 1) (D5)
for T (n, η) ≤ 112
(
ηn
1−η
)4
, η = K−n+5K+n−5 and K = n(dA + dB)
(
1 + 2
√
ln(8/ε)
2n +
ln(8/ε)
n
)(
1− 2
√
ln(8/ε)
2k
)−1
. The
first term in Eq. (D5) results from the de Finetti reduction and the second term results for the energy test failure
probability.
In particular, for n ≥ 38 and K ≥ n − 5, we obtain the bound T (n, η) + 1 ≤ K4100 from Eq. (C5). This yields
ε′ ≤ K450 ε, which corresponds to Eq. (5) in the main text.
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Appendix E: Generalization of the postselection technique of Ref. [4]
The goal of this section is to prove the following theorem (Theorem 2 in the main text).
Theorem 22 (Theorem 2 of the main text). Let ∆ : End(F≤K1,1,n)→ End(H′) such that for all u ∈ U(n), there exists
a CPTP map Ku : End(H′)→ End(H′) such that ∆ ◦ u = Ku : ◦∆, then
‖∆‖⋄ ≤ 2T (n, η)‖(∆⊗ id)τηHN ‖1,
for η = K−n+5K+n−5 , provided that n ≥ N∗(K/(n− 5)).
One way to make sure that the input of the map is indeed restricted to states with less than K photons is to replace
∆ by ∆ ◦ P≤K .
In the following, for conciseness, we will denote by H the symmetric subspace:
H := FU(n)2,2,n .
Let τηH be the normalized state corresponding to the projector Pη defined in Eq. (C1):
τηH = T (n, η)
−1
∫
Dη
|Λ, n〉〈Λ, n|dµn(Λ)
where
T (n, η) := tr(Pη) =
(n− 1)(n− 2)2(n− 3)η4
12(1− η)4 . (E1)
Consider an orthonormal basis {|νi〉} of FU(n)2,2,n and define the non normalizable operator
|Φ〉HN :=
∑
i
|νi〉H|νi〉N .
A conjecture for an explicit such orthonormal basis was given in [19], but we do not need to have such an explicit
basis for our present purpose.
Let us further define the state |Φη〉 ∈ FU(n)2,2,n ⊗ FU(n)2,2,n :
|Φη〉 =
(√
τη ⊗ 1
)
|Φ〉.
It is well-known that |Φη〉 is a purification of τηH:
trN (|Φη〉〈Φη|HN ) = τηH.
Recall that F
U(n),≤K
2,2,n denotes the finite-dimensional subspace of F
U(n)
2,2,n with less than K excitations.
Lemma 23. Let ρ be an arbitrary density operator on F
U(n),≤K
2,2,n . Then there exists a binary measurement M =
{MN ,1N −MN} on N applied to |Φη〉 ∈ H⊗N that successfully prepares the state ρ with probability at least 12T (n,η) .
Proof. To avoid cluttering up the notations, let us write τ instead of τηH. Recall that τ ≥ p1FU(n),≤K2,2,n with p =
1
2T (n,η) ,
as a consequence of Corollary 17.
Let us define the non negative operator M := pτ−1/2ρτ−1/2. Since p−1τ ≥ 1 on the support of ρ ≤ 1, the operator
M satisfies
0 ≤M ≤ 1.
Let us define the measurement M = {M,1−M}. Performing this measurement on state |Φη〉 prepares the state
trN
(
(1⊗M1/2)|Φη〉〈Φη|(1⊗M1/2)
)
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with probability 〈Φη|(1 ⊗M)|Φη〉. This state can be written:
trN
(
(1⊗M1/2)|Φη〉〈Φη|(1⊗M1/2)
)
= trN
(
(1⊗M1/2) (√τ ⊗ 1) |Φ〉〈Φ| (√τ ⊗ 1) (1⊗M1/2))
= trN

(τ1/2 ⊗M1/2)∑
i,j
|νi〉〈νj | ⊗ |νi〉〈νj |(τ1/2 ⊗M1/2)


=
∑
i,j
τ1/2|νi〉〈νj |τ1/2〈νj |M1/2M1/2|νi〉
=
∑
i,j
τ1/2|νi〉〈νj |τ1/2〈νi|M1/2M1/2|νj〉 (E2)
=
∑
i,j
τ1/2|νi〉〈νi|M1/2M1/2|νj〉〈νj |τ1/2
= τ1/2M1/2M1/2τ1/2
= τ1/2pτ−1/2ρτ−1/2τ1/2
= pρ,
and it is obtained with probability p. In Eq. (E2), we used that M is symmetric, that is 〈λi|M |λj〉 = 〈λj |M |λi〉.
Lemma 24. For k ≥ 0 and n ≥ 4, the dimensions of V=K and V≤K = FU(n),≤K2,2,n are given by
dimV=K =
(
K+3
3
)
and dimV≤K =
(
K+4
4
)
.
Proof. It was proven in [19] that the vectors (Z1,1)
i(Z1,2)
j(Z2,1)
k(Z2,2)
ℓ are independent (provided than n ≥ 4), which
means that the dimension of V=K is the cardinality of the sets of quadruples {(i, j, k, ℓ) ∈ N4 : i + j + k + ℓ = K}.
This number is
(
K+3
3
)
. More generally, the number of t-uples of nonnegative integers that sum to K is
(
n+K−1
n−1
)
.
Since the subspaces V=K are orthogonal, it follows that dim V≤K =
∑K
k=0 dimV=k, which can be computed explicitly.
Alternatively, one can see that the space V≤K of quadruples (i, j, k, ℓ) summing to K −m for some integer m ≤ K
corresponds to the space of 5-uples (i, j, k, ℓ,m) that sum to K.
Lemma 25. For any K and n integers, there exists a finite subset U ⊂ U(n), such that for any state ρ with support
on F≤K1,1,n, the subspace of F1,1,n restricted to states with less than K photons, the following holds:
1
|U|
∑
u∈U
VuρV
†
u =
∫
VuρV
†
udu,
where du is the normalized Haar measure on U(n).
Note that by definition of the Haar measure, the state
∫
VuρV
†
udu is invariant under the application of any unitary
u′ ∈ U(n): Vu′
∫
VuρV
†
uduV
†
u′ =
∫
VuρV
†
udu, which means that it has support on F
U(n),≤K
1,1,n .
Proof. By linearity, it is sufficient to establish the lemma for pure states |ψ〉 ∈ F≤K1,1,n. Such a state can be written as
|ψ〉 =
∑
k1,...,kn,ℓ1,...ℓn∑
ki+ℓi≤K
λk1...kn,ℓ1...ℓn
n∏
i=1
(
a†i
)ki (
b†i
)ℓi |0〉.
Applying Vu maps a
†
i to
∑n
j=1 ui,ja
†
j and b
†
i to
∑n
j=1 ui,jb
†
j . In other words, the function f : u 7→ Vu|ψ〉〈ψ|V †u is a
polynomial of degree at most K in u and u. Taking U to be a K-design of U(n), we obtain that
1
|U|
∑
u∈U
f(u) =
∫
f(u)du,
which proves the result.
We recall the following theorem that was established in [19].
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Theorem 26. Any density operator ρ ∈ S(F1,1,n) invariant under U(n) admits a purification in FU(n)2,2,n .
Lemma 27. It is sufficient to consider states ρHN with support on F
U(n),≤K
2,2,n when computing the diamond norm of
Theorem 22.
Proof. Consider a state ρHN with support on F
≤K
2,2,n. Let U be a finite set of unitaries as promised by Lemma 25. Let
{|u〉C}u∈U be an orthogonal basis for some classical register C. The following sequence of equalities holds:
‖(∆⊗ 1)ρHN ‖1 = 1|U|
∑
u∈U
‖(∆⊗ 1)(ρHN ⊗ |u〉〈u|C)‖1
=
∥∥∥∥∥ 1|U|
∑
u∈U
(∆⊗ 1)(ρHN ⊗ |u〉〈u|C)
∥∥∥∥∥
1
(E3)
=
∥∥∥∥∥ 1|U|
∑
u∈U
(Ku ◦∆⊗ 1)(ρHN ⊗ |u〉〈u|C)
∥∥∥∥∥
1
(E4)
=
∥∥∥∥∥ 1|U|
∑
u∈U
(∆ ◦ u⊗ 1)(ρHN ⊗ |u〉〈u|C)
∥∥∥∥∥
1
(E5)
=
∥∥∥∥∥(∆⊗ 1)
(
1
|U|
∑
u∈U
((u ◦ 1)ρHN ⊗ |u〉〈u|C)
)∥∥∥∥∥
1
where we used that the classical states |u〉 are all pairwise orthogonal in Eq. (E3), that Ku is trace preserving in
Eq. (E4), that Ku ◦∆ = ∆ ◦ u in Eq. (E5). Consider now the reduced state ρ˜H:
ρ˜H = trNC
(
1
|U|
∑
u∈U
((u ◦ 1)ρHN ⊗ |u〉〈u|C)
)
=
1
|U|
∑
u∈U
VuρHV †u =
∫
VuρHV †u du
where the last equality follows from Lemma 25. Theorem 26 now assures the existence of some purification ρ˜HN of
ρ˜H in F
U(n),≤K
2,2,n
∼= H⊗N . In particular, there exists a CPTP map g : End(N )→ End(N ⊗ C) such that
1
|U|
∑
u∈U
((u ◦ 1)ρHN ⊗ |u〉〈u|C) = (1H ⊗ g)ρ˜HN .
Since g is trace preserving, it further implies that
‖(∆⊗ 1)ρHN ‖1 = ‖(∆⊗ 1)(1H ⊗ g)ρHN ‖1 = ‖(∆⊗ 1)ρ˜HN ‖1,
which concludes the proof
We are now in position to prove Theorem 22.
Theorem 22. Let ∆ : End(F≤K1,1,n)→ End(H′) such that for all u ∈ U(n), there exists a CPTP map Ku : End(H′)→
End(H′) such that ∆ ◦ u = Ku : ◦∆, then
‖∆‖⋄ ≤ 2T (n, η)‖(∆⊗ id)τηHN ‖1,
for η = K−n+5K+n−5 , provided that n ≥ N∗(K/(n− 5)).
Proof. According to Lemma 27, it is sufficient to prove the theorem for a state ρHN on F
U(n),≤K
2,2,n . Lemma 23
guarantees the existence of a trace-non-increasing map T from a copy of FU(n),≤K2,2,n to C such that
ρHN = 2T (n, η)(1⊗ T )(|Φη〉〈Φη|).
This gives
(∆⊗ 1)ρHN = 2T (n, η)(∆⊗ T )(|Φη〉〈Φη|)
and finally that
‖(∆⊗ 1)ρHN ‖1 = 2T (n, η)‖(∆⊗ T )(|Φη〉〈Φη|)‖1.
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Appendix F: Security against collective attacks provides a bound on ‖R ◦∆ ◦ P‖⋄
In order to exploit Theorem 22, one needs an upper bound on ‖((R ◦∆ ◦ P≤K)⊗ id)τηHN ‖1. We will see that such
a bound can be obtained if the protocol is known to be secure against Gaussian collective attacks. For this, we follow
the same strategy as in [4]. Let us first recall the definition of being secure against Gaussian collective attacks.
Definition 28. The QKD protocol E0 is ε-secure against Gaussian collective attacks if
‖((E0 −F0)⊗ id)(|Λ, n〉〈Λ, n|)‖1 ≤ ε (F1)
for all Λ ∈ D.
We show the following result.
Theorem 29. With the previous notations, if E0 is ε-secure against Gaussian collective attacks, then
‖(R ◦∆ ◦ P≤K ⊗ id)τηHN ‖1 ≤ ε,
where τηHN is a purification of τ
η
H. Here R is an additional privacy amplification step that reduces the key by
⌈2 log2
(
K+4
4
)⌉ bits and P≤K is the projection onto F≤K1,1,n.
Proof. Recall that
τηH = T (n, η)
−1
∫
Dη
|Λ, n〉〈Λ, n|dµn(Λ)
where
T (n, η) := tr(Pη) =
(n− 1)(n− 2)2(n− 3)η4
12(1− η)4 .
By linearity, it holds that
‖((E − F)⊗ id)(τηH)‖1 = ‖((E − F)⊗ id)(T (n, η)−1
∫
Λ∈Dη
|Λ, n〉〈Λ, n|dµn(Λ))‖1
≤ εT (n, η)−1
∥∥∥∥∥
∫
Λ∈Dη
dµn(Λ)
∥∥∥∥∥
1
= ε
In order to obtain the theorem, we need to consider a purification of τηHN . Since P≤K restricts the states to live in a
space of dimension at most dimF
U(n),≤K
2,2,n =
(
K+4
4
)
(according to Lemma 24), it implies that the purifying system N
can be chosen of this dimension. Giving this extra system to Eve can at most provide her with a limited amount of
information. Applying an additional privacy amplification step R ensures that the protocol remains ε-secure for the
state τηHN thanks to the leftover hashing lemma (Theorem 5.1.1 of [12]):
‖(R ◦∆ ◦ P≤K ⊗ id)τηHN ‖1 ≤ ‖(∆ ◦ P≤K ⊗ id)τηH‖1.
Combining this result with Theorem 22 yields Theorem 19.
Theorem 19. With the previous notations, if E0 is ε-secure against Gaussian collective attacks, then
‖R ◦ (E0 −F0) ◦ P≤K‖⋄ ≤ 2T (n, η)ε.
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Appendix G: Energy test
The goal of this section is to prove the following result.
Theorem 20. For integers n, k ≥ 1, and dA, dB > 0, define K = n(d′A + d′B) for d′A/B = dA/Bg(n, k, ε/4) for the
function g defined in Eq. (G1). Then ∥∥(
1− P(n,K)) ◦ T (k, dA, dB)∥∥⋄ ≤ ε.
For d > 0, let us introduce the following operators on H⊗n for a single-mode Fock space H:
T dn :=
1
πn
∫
∑
n
i=1 |αi|2≥nd
|α1〉〈α1| ⊗ . . .⊗ |αn〉〈αn|dα1 . . . αn
Udn :=
∞∑
m=nd+1
Πnm,
where Πnm is the projector onto the subspace of H⊗n spanned by Fock states containing m photons:
Πnm =
∑
m1+...+mn=m
|m1, . . . ,mn〉〈m1, . . . ,mn|.
In words, T dn is the sum of the projectors onto products of coherent states such that the total squared amplitude is
greater than nd and Udn is the projector onto Fock states containing more that nd photons. Intuitively, both operators
should be “close” to each other. This is formalized with the following lemma that was proven in [11].
Lemma 30. For any integer n and any d ≥ 0, it holds that
Udn ≤ 2T dn .
The following lemma results from the definitions of Udn and P≤K , the projector onto F≤K1,1,n.
Lemma 31. For any dA, dB ≥ 0 and integer K such that K ≤ n(dA + dB), it holds that
1H⊗nA ⊗H⊗nB − P
≤K ≤ UdAn ⊗ 1H⊗nB + 1H⊗nA ⊗ U
dB
n .
Proof. The left hand side is the projector onto the states of H⊗nA ⊗ H⊗nB containing strictly more than K photons.
Any such state must contain either at least ndA photons in H⊗nA or at least K−ndA photons in H⊗nB , for any possible
value of dA. This proves the claim.
Combining Lemmas 30 and 31, we obtain the immediate corollary.
Corollary 32. For any dA, dB ≥ 0 and integer K such that K ≤ n(dA + dB), it holds that
1H⊗nA ⊗H⊗nB − P
≤K ≤ 2T dAn ⊗ 1H⊗nB + 21H⊗nA ⊗ T
dB
n .
Recall that the heterodyne measurement corresponds to a projection onto (Glauber) coherent states, and is described
by the resolution of the identity:
1H⊗k =
1
πk
∫
Ck
|α1〉〈α1| ⊗ . . .⊗ |αk〉〈αk|dα1 . . . dαk.
In other words, measuring a state ρ on H⊗k with heterodyne detection outputs the result (α1, . . . , αk) ∈ Ck with
probability
Prρ(α1, . . . , αk) =
1
πk
tr(ρ|α1〉〈α1| ⊗ . . .⊗ |αk〉〈αk|).
Laurent and Massart [30] established the following tail bounds for χ2(D) distributions.
Lemma 33 (Laurent and Massard [30]). Let U be a χ2 statistic with D degrees of freedom. For any x > 0,
Pr[U −D ≥ 2
√
Dx+ 2Dx] ≤ exp(−x) and Pr[D − U ≥ 2
√
Dx] ≤ exp(−x).
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Definition 34. A state ρ on H⊗n = F (Cn) is said rotationally invariant is VuρV †u = ρ for all u ∈ U(n).
In particular, the state
∫
VuρV
†
Udu is invariant if du is the Haar measure on U(n).
Lemma 35. Let ρ be an rotationally invariant state on H⊗(n+k). Then, for any d > 0,
tr
[
(T d
′
n ⊗ (1− T dk ))ρ
]
≤ ε,
for d′ = g(n, k, ε)d and
g(n, k, ε) =
1 + 2
√
ln(2/ε)
2n +
ln(2/ε)
n
1− 2
√
ln(2/ε)
2k
. (G1)
Proof. By definition, tr[T dk ρ] is the probability that the outcome (α1, . . . , αk) ∈ Ck obtained by measuring the last
k modes of the state ρ with heterodyne detection satisfies
∑k
i=1 |αi|2 ≥ kd. Similarly, tr
[
((T d
′
n ⊗ (1− T dk ))ρ
]
is the
probability that the outcome of measuring the n+k modes of ρ with heterodyne detection yields a vector (α1, . . . , αn+k)
such that
Yn :=
n∑
i=1
|αi|2 ≥ nd′ and Yk :=
k∑
i=1
|αn+i|2 ≤ kd.
Since the state is rotationally invariant, it means that the random vector (α1, . . . , αn+k) is uniformly distributed on
the sphere of radius M in Cn+k, conditioned on the fact that the modulus is
√∑n+k
i=1 |αi|2 = M . Equivalently, one
can consider the 2(n+k)-dimensional real vector (R(α1), I(α1), . . . ,R(α1), I(α1)) which is uniformly distributed over
the sphere in R2(n+k). Here R(α1) and I(α) refer respectively to the real and imaginary part of α. We obtain
tr
[
(T d
′
n ⊗ (1− T dk ))ρ
]
= Pr[(Yn ≥ nd′) ∧ (Yk ≤ kd)]
≤ Pr[kdYn ≥ nd′Yk]
where the inequality is a simple consequence of the fact that the rectangle [nd′,∞]× [0, kd] is a subset of the triangle
{(x, y) ∈ [0,∞]2 : kdx ≥ nd′y}.
It is well-known that the uniform distribution over the unit sphere of R2(n+k) can be generated by sampling 2(n+k)
normal variables with 0 mean and unit variance. In that case, the squared norm
∑n
i=1 |αi|2 is simply a χ2 variable
with 2n degrees of freedom while
∑k
i=1 |αn+i|2 corresponds to an independent χ2 variable with 2k degrees of freedom.
Let us denote by Zn and Zk the corresponding random variables: Zn ∼ χ2(2n), Zk ∼ χ2(2k). Since (Yn, Yk) and
(Zn, Zk) follow the same distribution, up to rescaling, we obtain that
Pr[kdYn ≥ nd′Yk] = Pr[kdZn ≥ nd′Zk].
This is particularly useful because it means that there is no need to enforce normalization explicitly. Finally, using
now that the triangle {(x, y) ∈ [0,∞]2 : kdx ≥ dd′y} is a subset of the union of the rectangles [αnd′,∞]× [0,∞] and
[0,∞]× [0, αkd] for any α > 0, it follows that
Pr[kdZn ≥ nd′Zk] ≤ Pr[Zn ≥ αnd′] + Pr[Zk ≤ αkd].
Choosing α such that
αkd = 2k
(
1− 2
√
ln(ε/2)
2k
)
and applying the lower bounds on the tails of the χ2 distribution given in Lemma 33 gives
Pr[Zn ≥ αnd′] ≤ ε
2
, Pr[Zk ≤ αkd] ≤ ε
2
.
This establishes that
tr
[
(T d
′
n ⊗ (1− T dk ))ρ
]
≤ ε,
which concludes the proof.
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We are now ready to define and analyze the energy test. Alice and Bob perform a random rotation of their data
according to a unitary u ∈ U(n) chosen from the Haar measure on U(n), and measure the last k modes of their
respective state with heterodyne detection. They compute the squared norm of their respective vectors and obtain
two values YA for Alice and YB for Bob. The test depends on three parameters: the number k of modes which are
measured, a maximum value for Alice dA and a maximum value for Bob, dB. The test T (k, dA, dB) passes if
YA ≤ kdA and YB ≤ kdB .
We are interested in the probability of passing the test and failing for the remaining modes to contain less than K
photons, more precisely in the quantity
‖(1− P) ◦ T ‖⋄.
Let us denote by Inv(S(H⊗(n+k))) the set of density matrices which are invariant under the action of U(n+ k).
Theorem 20. For integers n, k ≥ 1, and dA, dB > 0, define K = n(d′A + d′B) for d′A/B = dA/Bg(n, k, ε/4) for the
function g defined in Eq. (G1). Then ∥∥(
1− P(n,K)) ◦ T (k, dA, dB)∥∥⋄ ≤ ε.
Proof. Writing P and T for conciseness, the definition of the diamond norm yields:
‖(1− P) ◦ T ‖⋄ = max
ρ∈H⊗(n+k)
AB
⊗H⊗(n+k)
AB
∥∥((1− P) ◦ T )⊗ 1H⊗(n+k)AB )(ρ)∥∥1
= max
ρ∈S(H⊗(n+k)
AB
)
‖(1− P) ◦ T (ρ)‖1 (G2)
≤ max
ρ∈Inv
(
S(H⊗(n+k)
AB
) ‖(1− P) ◦ T (ρ)‖1 (G3)
≤ max
ρ∈Inv
(
S(H⊗(n+k)
AB
) ‖(Ud
′
A
n ⊗ 1+ 1⊗ Ud
′
B
n ) ◦
(
(1− T dAk )⊗ (1− T dBk )
)
(ρ)‖1 (G4)
= max
ρ∈Inv
(
S(H⊗(n+k)AB
) ‖(Ud
′
A
n ◦ (1− T dAk ) + Ud
′
B
n ◦ (1− T dBk ))(ρ)‖1
≤ max
ρ∈Inv
(
S(H⊗(n+k)
A
) ‖(Ud
′
A
n ◦ (1− T dAk ))(ρ)‖1 + max
ρ∈Inv
(
S(H⊗(n+k)
B
) ‖(Ud
′
B
n ◦ (1− T dBk ))(ρ)‖1 (G5)
≤ 2 max
ρ∈Inv
(
S(H⊗(n+k)
A
) ‖(T d
′
A
n ◦ (1− T dAk ))(ρ)‖1 + 2 max
ρ∈Inv
(
S(H⊗(n+k)
B
) ‖(T d
′
B
n ◦ (1− T dBk ))(ρ)‖1 (G6)
≤ ε (G7)
where we used that
(
(1 − P) ◦ T ) ⊗ 1H⊗(n+k)AB
)
(ρ) is a nonnegative operator in Eq. (G2), the fact that both P and
T are rotationally invariant in Eq. (G3), Lemma 31 in Eq. (G4), the triangle inequality in Eq. (G5), Lemma 35 in
Eq. (G7).
